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The current research addresses the psychological benefits of superstitious rituals in
top sport, examining the circumstances under which top-class sportspersons are
especially committed to enacting rituals prior to a game (ritual commitment).
Consistent with the hypotheses, findings revealed that ritual commitment is greater
when (a) uncertainty is high rather than low; and (b) importance of the game is high
rather than low. Complementary analyses revealed that the state of psychological
tension mediated both effect of importance and uncertainty on ritual commitment.
Moreover, players with an external locus of control exhibited greater levels of ritual
commitment than did players with an internal locus of control. The results are
discussed in terms of the tension-regulation function of superstitious rituals in top
sport.
Some football players want to enter the field first, others want to enter
the field last, whereas still others want to touch the grass just upon entering
the field. And yet some players want to wear the same shirt, the same
clothes, or even the same underwear for a long series of matches. It is not
difficult to list more examples of what may be termed superstitious rituals. In
fact, most sportspersons seem to be at least somewhat superstitious, espe-
cially those who are performing at the top.
Why is it that seemingly sane sportspersons sometimes act in rather
unusual ways before a match? Do they need to engage in such acts in every
match? Does it also depend on the team for which they are playing? And
does it matter whether the stakes are high or low? The present research
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earlier version of this manuscript, and Peter Dekker for his statistical advice.
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mus University, Room T8-46, Burg. Oudlaan 50, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The
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addresses these questions, thereby seeking to illuminate the broader psy-
chological benefits that top sportspersons may derive from engaging in
rather unusual behaviors.
Superstitious Rituals: Broad Explanations
Superstitious rituals are defined as unusual, repetitive, rigid behavior that
is perceived to have a positive effect by the actor, whereas in reality there is
no causal link between the behavior and the outcome of an event (Womack,
1992). Superstitious rituals differ from a normal routine in that the person
gives the action a special, magical significance. However, the distinction
between superstition and preparing for the game is not always clear.
As noted by Vyse (1997), ‘‘It is often difficult to draw the line between
superstition and useful preparation’’ (p. 90). For some superstitious rituals,
it is easy to see that they have no function in a useful preparation, but most
superstitions are difficult to distinguish from preparing for performance.
A function of rituals might be preparing mentally for each performance. In
this sense, rituals seem to serve a rational and useful purpose (cf. Neil, 1980).
How does this superstitious behavior originate and why does it continue?
Several possible behavioral and cognitive explanations for superstitious be-
havior may be advanced. First, one line of reasoning may be derived from
classic work by Skinner (1948, 1953), who discovered that superstitious
behavior can arise through conditioning. In one of his famous experiments
on operant conditioning, Skinner (1948) gave pigeons in the so-called
‘‘Skinner box’’ food at irregular intervals. Hence, it was left to chance as to
what kind of behavior was being reinforced. The results were astonishing.
The pigeons kept doing what they did at the moment that the food was
administered. For example, a pigeon that had just turned its head continued
turning its head; and a pigeon that happened to walk around continued
walking around. The behavior was difficult to unlearn because the rein-
forcement (i.e., food) was administered at irregular intervals. Skinner (1948)
labeled this curious behavior superstitious, arguing that ‘‘The bird behaves
as if there were a causal relation between its behavior and the presentation
of food’’ (p. 171). In a later article (Skinner, 1953), he suggested that seeing a
causal relationship between behavior and the ‘‘consequences’’ also could
explain the occurrence and maintenance of superstition in humans.
A second, complementary explanation may be derived from Langer and
colleagues’ (Langer, 1975, 1977; Langer & Roth, 1975) work on illusion of
control. Langer stated that, in general, people are inclined to see themselves
as a cause, even in situations in which they are not influencing the situation.
This explanation holds that people carry out superstitious behaviors in order
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to influence situations in which, in reality, they have no control. According
to Langer, this is especially true in situations in which chance as well as skill
play a role. In competitive sports, there is always a mixture of chance as well
as skill that determines the outcome of a match. Therefore, in these situ-
ations, people will probably be more prone to the illusion of control and
superstition.
Several explanations may be provided to account for the inclination to
see control (often taking the form of ability or skill) in an event in which
outcome is completely determined by chance. A first possibility is that peo-
ple are inclined to see a causal link between their actions and outcomes,
when in fact there is none. This explanation is similar to what Skinner (1948)
concluded from his research on pigeons.
A second explanation is that people suppose that the world is fair (i.e.,
just-world hypothesis; Lerner, 1965). The just-world hypothesis states that
people have a need to believe that their environment is a just and orderly
place in which people usually get what they deserve and deserve what they
get. By fostering this illusion, people can behave as if chance plays no part,
and only a direct relationship between behavior and the consequences of
behavior exists.
A third, more attributional explanation holds that people are generally
inclined to attribute success to their skills and abilities, and to attribute
failure to external circumstances (Feather, 1969). This might be the reason
why people are inclined to attribute positive outcomes mistakenly to their
skills and abilities, which in reality occur as a result of luck. Thus, people
may by nature be inclined to confuse skill and chance, which may explain
why people think that they can influence chance or fate by carrying out
superstitious rituals.
Situational and Personal Determinants of Superstitious Rituals
The central purpose of the present research is to examine the circum-
stances under which superstition will be most pronounced, and to examine
individual differences in the extent to which people feel the need to carry out
superstitious rituals. When will people be most prone to developing super-
stitious rituals? We argue that people carry out rituals in an uncertain sit-
uation; in which the outcome is not only uncertain, but the outcome also is
important to them. Another question is whether differences in personality
will influence the extent to which people feel the need to carry out rituals.
We argue that people who differ in locus of controlFthe extent to which
people see the environment as controllableFalso differ in the extent to
which they feel tension and are self-confident before a game and hence differ
in the extent to which they are inclined to be superstitious.
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Uncertainty and Importance of the Outcome
An assumption underlying the present research is that the enactment of
superstitious rituals serves the function of reducing psychological tension. It
should be clear that prior to a game, top sportspersons will experience
psychological tension, as the game by itself should activate several specific
feelings (e.g., feeling restless), thoughts (e.g., self-doubts), or physiological
responses (e.g., trembling) that are captured by the concept of psychological
tension. We suggest that psychological tension generally will vary from op-
ponent to opponent and from game to game.
To begin with, given that top sport is about winning versus losing, the
standing of the other team (i.e., the opponent) relative to one’s own team
should be an important ingredient in uncertainty. If one is quite confident
that one will beat the opponent, then the uncertainty should be low. How-
ever, if the other team is equally good or superior to one’s own team then
the uncertainty should be high. Hence, we assume that the relative standing
of the opponent causes uncertainty, such that uncertainty is high when the
opponent is of equal or superior standing, but relatively low when the op-
ponent is of inferior standing. As a result, psychological tension should be
greater when the opponent is at least as good as one’s own team.3
Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that uncertainty regarding future
outcome is an important determinant of superstition. For example, it often
has been assumed that the illusion of control tends to be more pronounced
for situations in which not only skill but also chance play a substantial role
(Langer, 1975, 1977; Langer & Roth, 1975). It has been argued that people
may react to uncertain and unpredictable situations with superstitious be-
liefs or actions (e.g., Malinovski, 1955; Vyse, 1997), thereby suggesting that
superstitious rituals are more likely or more pronounced, as situations are
characterized by more uncertainty regarding the outcome. However, as far
as we know, there is virtually no research that is of direct relevance to the
link between uncertainty and superstition. The only research that we were
able to locate was a study by Bleak and Frederick (1998), which examined
the effects of sport anxiety (i.e., involving measures of somatic anxiety,
3One could argue that the condition of ‘‘playing an equal opponent’’ should be exactly in
between the conditions of playing a superior opponent or an inferior opponent. However, we
expect greater ritual commitment when playing an equal opponent or a superior opponent,
rather than an inferior opponent. This expectation is based partially on the notion that losses
loom larger than gains and that people are oriented more strongly toward minimizing losses
than toward maximizing gains (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). We suggest that the pos-
sibility of losing, coupled with the belief that one is able to minimize the likelihood of a loss, is
relatively higher when playing an equal team or a superior team. Hence, level of uncertainty
(and, as a consequence, level of ritual commitment) should be greater when playing an equal or
a superior team, rather than playing an inferior team.
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worry, and concentration disruption) on overall use of superstitious behav-
ior. However, this research did not reveal any significant effects of sport
anxiety on the overall use of superstitious behavior.
In addition to uncertainty regarding outcomes, we suggest that super-
stition also should be affected by the importance attached to the outcome in
a given situation. When outcomes are not considered to be very important,
individuals should feel more or less relaxed, and the level of psychological
tension should be low. In contrast, when outcomes are considered to be very
important, people generally should experience greater psychological tension
(e.g., feeling nervous and restless, having obsessive thoughts about the game,
having increased blood pressure). For example, sportspersons typically ex-
perience greater psychological tension when playing in the finals than when
playing a training match. As a result, tendencies toward superstition should
be greater when the importance of the outcome is high rather than low.
While this line of reasoning seems plausible (cf. Vyse, 1997), to our
knowledge there is no research that has assessed the link between importance
and superstition. In fact, we know of only one study investigating the effect of
the importance of success on the use of superstitious behavior (Bleak &
Frederick, 1998). Bleak and Frederick revealed that the importance of success
was unrelated to the overall use of superstitious behavior, but it was related to
the degree to which they reported engaging in specific rituals.
Perhaps more indirect evidence can be derived from research focusing on
self-enhancement, which is the tendency to believe that one is better than and
not as bad as others (cf. Sedikides & Strube, 1997). For example, tendencies
toward self-enhancement are stronger for situations (or characteristics) that
are considered to be more important (e.g., Greenwald, 1980; Rusbult, Van
Lange, Yovetich, Wildschut, & Verette, 2000; Van Lange, 1991) or more
threatening to the self (cf. Taylor & Brown, 1988) than for situations that
are considered less important or less threatening. While preliminary, the
previously discussed lines of research add credence to the possibility that
individuals are more likely to engage in superstitious rituals to the extent to
which a situation is characterized by greater uncertainty and to the extent to
which outcome is more important to the person.
It is important to note that in the one study that examined uncertainty
and importance, Bleak and Frederick (1998) measured individual uncer-
tainty and ratings of importance, rather than uncertainty and importance
as key features of the situation. That is, they did not compare different
situations that presumably differ in terms of uncertainty or importance. The
present research seeks to extend this research by focusing on situational
differences that are experienced by nearly every sportsman. That is, by
comparing different situations systematically, the current research examines
the effects of situational uncertainty as well as the importance of the goals to
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be reached on the extent to which participants are committed to engaging in
rituals. In other words, the extent to which they wish or need to engage in
ritual, which we refer to as ritual commitment.
Situational uncertainty and importance will be manipulated by means of
six scenarios in which situations of matches will be described. Situational
uncertainty will be operationalized as relative standing. It is assumed that
participants will feel more uncertainty playing a superior or an equal op-
ponent versus a rather weak opponent. Importance is operationalized in
terms of the nature of the game that the team must play: the finals (i.e., the
importance of the outcome is high) versus a training match (i.e., the im-
portance of the outcome is low).
Thus, ritual commitment is expected to vary as a function of both un-
certainty and importance of the situation. Moreover, we hypothesize that
these effects will be mediated by psychological tension. That is, we expect
that psychological tension will be enhanced by relative standing, as well as
by the importance attached to the outcome, and that both effects can ac-
count at least partially for their effects on ritual commitment.
Locus of Control
Considerable research has revealed that individuals differ in the extent to
which they perceive the environment as controllable. Individuals with an
internal locus of control (i.e., internals) are inclined to see events as the
consequence of their actions, whereas individuals with an external locus of
control (i.e., externals) are inclined to see the same events as unrelated to
their actions and, rather, as a consequence of luck, chance, fate, powerful
others, or as unpredictable (Rotter, 1966).
The concept of locus of control is related strongly to social learning
theory. For example, Strickland (1989) argued that internal and external
orientations of people have to do with ‘‘generalized expectancies that reflect
consistent individual differences among individuals in the degree to which
they perceive contingencies or independence between their behavior and
subsequent events’’ (p. 1). The concept is one of the most widely explored
concepts in many areas of psychology, and it has been associated with
behaviors as diverse as social action (Gore & Rotter, 1963; Sank & Strick-
land, 1973; Strickland, 1965), coping with diseases (Reid, 1984), divorce
(Statlender, 1983), boredom (Schippers, 1998), health-related behaviors
(Strickland, 1978), conformity (Crowne & Liverant, 1963), and job involve-
ment (Reitz & Jewell, 1979; for reviews, see Furnham & Steel, 1993;
Lefcourt, 1976, 1981, 1983, 1984; Strickland, 1989). The general pattern is
that, relative to externals, internals experience greater levels of control,
lower levels of learned helplessness (when challenged), and engage more
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actively in several coping strategies when problems arise (Benassi, Sweeny, &
Dufour, 1988; Seligman & Maier, 1967).
However, it is surprising that past research on the relationship between
locus of control and superstition has not yielded unequivocal findings. Al-
though most researchers have found that externals are more prone to engage
in superstitious rituals (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983; also see Vyse, 1997), there
is evidence in support of the opposite position (Van Raalte, Brewer,
Nemeroff, & Linder, 1991). We suggest that two lines of reasoning can be
advanced to account for these contradictory findings. The first line of rea-
soning is that externals rely more on superstitious behavior. The rationale
for this line of reasoning is that because externals ascribe more control to
external factors, they may experience a stronger need to engage in super-
stitious rituals in order to ‘‘influence luck.’’
The second line of reasoning indicates that internals will rely more on
superstitious behavior. The rationale for this line of reasoning is that internals
who are experiencing greater control, as well as exhibiting greater illusion of
control, will try to make the situation more controllable by carrying out
superstitious rituals. We know of only one (albeit very interesting) study that
provides some preliminary evidence in support of this line of reasoning. In
that study, Van Raalte et al. (1991) first assessed locus of control and then
asked participants without experience with playing golf to putt a golf ball.
Participants were free to choose a golf ball from four colors and had 50 putts
each. Superstitious behavior was operationalized in this study as the extent to
which participants chose the same colored golf ball for the next putt after
having made a putt. It was found that participants who believed that their
actions could control chance were more likely to choose the same colored
‘‘lucky’’ ball after a successful putt, hence suggesting that internals are more
inclined to engage in superstitious ritual than are externals.
Based on the previously discussed lines of reasoning and empirical ev-
idence, we advance two competing hypotheses. One hypothesis is that ex-
ternals will feel more tension and will exhibit greater ritual commitment than
will internals. The other hypothesis is that internals will feel more tension
and will exhibit greater ritual commitment than will externals.
Research Overview and Hypotheses
The major purpose of the present research is to examine the situational
(relative standing and importance) and person-related (locus of control)
determinants of ritual commitment among top-class sportspersons. Relative
standing and importance are manipulated in six realistic scenarios. In ex-
amining relative standing, we varied three opponents that participants
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would face in a match: an opponent that is believed to be inferior, equal, or
superior to their own team whereby relative standing was based on past
performance. We propose that uncertainty (and psychological tension) will
be greater when the opponent is superior or equal to their own team than
when the opponent is inferior to their own team. In examining importance,
we varied between a very important match (i.e., the finals) and an unim-
portant match (i.e., a training match). Hence, the six scenarios systemat-
ically manipulate the relative standing (superior, equal, or inferior) and the
importance of the match (finals vs. training match).
To summarize, we advance the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. When the relative standing of the opponent is
either superior (high uncertainty) or equal (moderate uncer-
tainty), sportspersons will be higher on ritual commitment than
when the relative standing of the opponent is inferior (low
uncertainty).
Hypothesis 2. Level of ritual commitment will be higher when
the importance of the outcome is high rather than low.
Regarding the link between locus of control and ritual commitment, the
following competing hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis 3a. Externals will exhibit greater levels of ritual
commitment than will internals.
Hypothesis 3b. Internals will exhibit greater levels of ritual
commitment than will externals.
Finally, as alluded to earlier, we expect the following:
Hypothesis 4. The extent to which people experience psycho-
logical tension before a match will mediate the predicted effects
of uncertainty and importance on ritual commitment.
In a more exploratory vein, we examine whether psychological tension will
illuminate the potential association between locus of control and ritual
commitment.
Method
Participants and Experimental Design
One hundred ninety-seven top-class sportspersons (145 men, 52 women)
from 23 top-ranking Dutch football (e.g., Ajax, PSV, Willem II), volleyball
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(e.g., Piet Zoomers/Dynamo), and hockey clubs (e.g., the Amsterdam
Hockey and Bandy club) participated in this study. The age of players varied
between 15 and 35 years (M age5 24 years). The experimental design of this
study was tested in a 3 (Relative Standing: superior, equal, or inferior) 2
(Importance of Outcome: high vs. low) 2 (Locus of Control: internal vs.
external) factorial design, with relative standing and importance of outcome
as within-participant variables and locus of control as a between-partici-
pants variable.
Procedure
Participants were recruited by contacting the trainers/coaches of top-
ranking sport teams. Top-ranking sport teams were chosen because it was
assumed that on those teams, superstitious rituals would be most pro-
nounced (see Neil, Anderson, & Sheppard, 1981).4 All but one of the con-
tacted clubs agreed to participate. Only one player refused to complete the
questionnaire, yielding a nearly 100% response rate.
Participants were informed that they would be questioned about their
superstitions. They then completed a questionnaire. This took place in the
player’s home or canteen. For two clubs and one national team, question-
naires were sent by mail.
Questionnaires
Locus of control. Locus of control (Andriessen, 1971; Rotter, 1966) was
measured by way of 12 items. A sample items is ‘‘Even if you do your
utmost, without luck things will not succeed.’’ The items were rated on a
6-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 6 (true). Cronbach’s alpha for
the 12 items was .72.
Superstition. Superstition was measured in several ways. An open ques-
tion about superstitious rituals asked ‘‘What rituals do you perform before a
game?’’ This question was designed to determine the kind and amount of
superstition among sportspersons.
Furthermore, two Likert-type questions assessed the extent to which
participants perceived themselves as superstitious. These questions are
‘‘How superstitious do you find yourself in comparison to other sportsper-
sons?’’ and ‘‘How superstitious do other sportspersons find you?’’ These
4One could argue that players of top-ranking clubs will find it important to win in all
situations. In that case, no difference with respect to superstition would be found in different
situations. However, as will be described in the Results, we found differences in how much
importance players attached to winning for different kinds of matches.
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items were rated on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all superstitious) to
6 (very superstitious). Responses to these questions were highly correlated
(r5 .69, po .001). Thus, the two items were collapsed to form a two-item
scale of self-rated superstition.5
Vignettes. The present study includes six vignettes that ask participants
to imagine a certain match. By means of the vignettes, relative standing and
importance of outcome were manipulated.
Relative standing was manipulated by varying the relative strength of the
fictitious opposing team. The vignette stated that it was either a team against
which their team has lost many of the previous matches (superior opponent),
a team against which their team has won as often as it has lost (equal
opponent), or a team against which their team has won most of the matches
(inferior opponent).
Importance of the outcome was manipulated by the type of match the
participants were asked to imagine. Participants were asked either to im-
agine that they were about to play the finals (high importance) or to play a
training match (low importance).
A sample vignette is ‘‘Imagine that you play in the finals. You will be
playing another team against which your team has usually lost (e.g., lost
seven times, won only once, and the match ended in a draw twice).’’ This
sample vignette outlines the high-importance/superior-opponent condition.
The questionnaire for the volleyball teams was slightly adjusted in that the
team, for instance, lost nine times and won only once, because a draw is not
possible in volleyball.
Following each vignette, seven Likert-type questions were asked. The
first three questions were manipulation checks. In order to check if the given
situations were recognizable, the first question asked whether participants
could imagine the vignette for themselves on a 6-point scale ranging from 1
(absolutely not) to 6 (absolutely). The second manipulation check asked
whether participants expected to win or lose the fictitious match, which was
rated on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (lose for sure) to 6 (win for sure). The
final manipulation check asked how important it was for participants to win
the match, which was rated on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all
important) to 6 (very important). In order to assess psychological tension in
each situation, participants were asked to rate how tense they were before
the match on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very).
5As a result of missing values on one of the measures, and to use the same sample in all
analyses, we disregarded the data of 29 participants. Alternative treatment of missing values
(e.g., disregarding data per measure) yielded virtually identical findings. Hence, all analyses are
based on a sample of 158 participants.
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Ritual commitment. Ritual commitment was assessed by two questions.
The first question asked how annoying participants thought it was if, for
whatever reason, they were not able to carry out the rituals they mentioned
before. This item was rated on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all
annoying) to 6 (very annoying). The second question asked how important it
was to participants to carry out the rituals they mentioned before. This item
was rated on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 6 (very
important). Responses to the two questions were significantly correlated (rs
varied from .83 to .90; all pso .001). Thus, the responses to these two
questions were averaged in subsequent analyses.




We conducted a 2 (Importance: high vs. low)  3 (Relative Standing:
inferior vs. equal vs. superior)  2 (Locus of Control: internal vs. external)
univariate ANOVA. Ability to imagine the situation outlined in the vignette
(judgments of realism) and expectations regarding winning or losing and
importance attached to winning, respectively, were dependent variables.
Judgments of realism. The results reveal that participants were quite able
to imagine the situations outlined in the vignettes (overall M5 4.64). A main
effect for the extent to which participants were able to imagine the situation
shows that participants were best able to depict the situation playing against an
inferior opponent (M5 4.99). The situation playing against an equal opponent
could be imagined to a lesser extent (M5 4.66); and the situation playing
against a superior opponent could be imagined least well (M5 4.28), F(1,
152)5 43.75, po .001. This may be because top-ranked clubs are more likely
to face an inferior opponent than a superior or even equal opponent. More-
over, such judgments also may be subject to mechanisms causing unrealistic or
illusory forms of superiority. No further effects were found to be significant.
Expectations of winning versus losing. For the question about whether
participants expected to win or lose the fictitious match, a main effect for
relative standing reveals that they were less confident of winning when fac-
ing a superior opponent (M5 4.43) than when facing an inferior opponent
(M5 5.52), with intermediate levels when facing an equal opponent
(M5 5.14), F(1, 152)5 202.97, po .001. These findings are perfectly con-
sistent with the intended manipulation of relative standing, although it
seems that people were quite confident of winning, even when facing a
superior opponent.
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Interestingly, though descriptively much smaller than the previously
mentioned effect, a main effect for importance reveals that when importance
of outcome was high (i.e., playing finals) participants had higher expecta-
tions of winning (M5 5.10), than when importance of outcome was low
(i.e., playing a training match) (M5 4.97), F(1, 152)5 6.15, po .05. No
further effects were found to be significant.
Importance of winning. For the question about how important it is for
participants to win the match, a main effect for importance reveals that
participants found it more important to win the game when importance of
the outcome is high (i.e., playing finals; M5 5.68) rather than low (i.e.,
playing a training match; M5 4.69), F(1, 155)5 117.62, po .001. No other
effects were found to be significant. Hence, the findings are perfectly con-
sistent with the intended manipulation of importance of outcome.
Descriptive Statistics: Prevalence of Superstitious Rituals
There were 158 participants (80.3%) who mentioned one or more su-
perstitious rituals they perform before a game, with a mean of 2.6 rituals per
person. The kinds of rituals they mentioned vary from wearing the same
shoes for every match to eating four pancakes before a home match. Par-
ticipants mentioned some striking rituals, such as putting a piece of chewing
gum in a trampled part of the football pitch, wearing shin guards all the way
from home to the place of the game (even when the participant had to wear
them for over 70 miles), having to see the number 13 at least once before the
game, kissing a football shirt, and smoking a cigarette in the morning before
the game. An overview of recurring rituals mentioned by the sportspersons
is presented in Table 1. From these results, it can be concluded that super-
stitious rituals are common among top-class players. No differences in kinds
or amount of rituals were found between the three sports.
As can be seen in Table 1, it is often difficult to distinguish superstitious
rituals from useful preparation. As a case in point, participants often mentioned
that they completed the preparation before the game in a fixed order. Some
even described in minute detail all the rituals they performed before the game,
from 9:00 a.m. until the onset of the game in the evening. If the ritual consisted
of eating special food, they often described the food in detail (i.e., eating steak
with mushrooms, two slices of bread with cheese, drinking Red Bull).
Warm-up rituals also were abundant. Participants often mentioned that
they would complete the exercises in a fixed order or practice with a set
teammate. If they were not able to carry out these rituals, they would feel
unhappy about it. Some even mentioned that ‘‘Things would definitely go
wrong’’ if they did not carry out their rituals. Idiosyncratic rituals, which
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Table 1
Recurring Rituals Mentioned by Participants
Ritual









Eat special food 43 10 13 66
Be involved in relax-
ing activities (e.g.,
watch TV, go for a
walk)
42 4 5 51
Enter the field in a
prescribed order, fixed
place in dressing
room, arrive at the
stadium in a fixed
order (first, second)





16 12 23 51
Go to bed early 15 1 3 19
Dress in a special
order
13 6 8 27
Warm up (e.g., in a
special place, same
order of exercises)
12 4 7 23
Take the time for
pregame activities
11 7 7 25
Look after equipment
(e.g., polish shoes)
10 2 6 18
Do things in a fixed
order




7 4 8 19
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can be seen as ‘‘pure’’ rituals because they have nothing to do with useful
preparation for the game, are mentioned under the heading of ‘‘Other’’ in
Table 1 because these are often quite unique, and therefore do not fit under
the other headings.
Effects of Relative Standing, Importance, and Locus of Control
To test Hypotheses 1 through 3, we conducted a 3 (Relative Standing:
superior, equal, or inferior opponent) 2 (Importance: high vs. low) 2
Table 1. Continued
Ritual









Go to the toilet (e.g.,
fixed time, fixed
number of times)
7 2 5 14
Interpersonal rituals
(e.g., wish everyone
good luck one by one,
fixed roommate, hit
goalie’s leg guards)
4 4 11 19
Get up at a set time 4 1 5 10
Stay home evening
before the game
4 1 1 6
Eat in a special place 3 2 2 7
Drive a set route to
the stadium
3 0 0 3
Celibacy before the
game
2 0 1 3
Pray/cross oneself 2 0 1 3
Other (e.g., call upon
deceased, kiss shirt,
put car in same place)
11 5 10 26
Total 247 77 125 449
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(Locus of Control: internal vs. external) ANOVA on ritual commitment.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, this analysis reveals a main effect for relative
standing, F(2, 312)5 14.83, po .001, indicating that when playing a supe-
rior (M5 3.01) or equal opponent (M5 2.98), ritual commitment is higher
than when playing an inferior opponent (M5 2.84). As a more direct test of
Hypothesis 1, planned comparisons reveal a significant contrast of inferior
opponent versus equal opponent and superior opponent, F(1, 156)5 14.83,
po .001.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, a main effect for importance of outcome
reveals that when importance was high (M5 3.27), ritual commitment was
higher than when importance was low (M5 2.61), F(1, 156)5 65.20,
po .001. There were no significant interaction effects.
Finally, we advanced competing hypotheses regarding the link of locus of
control with ritual commitment. Consistent with Hypothesis 3a (and in-
consistent with Hypothesis 3b), the analysis reveals that externals (M5 3.20)
exhibited greater levels of ritual commitment than did internals (M5 2.69),
F(1, 156)5 5.29, po .05. Thus, individuals who are prone to believe that
outcomes are externally determined (rather than determined by themselves)
exhibit greater ritual commitment.
Mediating Role of Psychological Tension
In Hypothesis 4, we predicted that psychological tension would mediate
the effects of uncertainty (caused by variation in relative standing) and
importance, and suggested that it might mediate the link between locus of
control and ritual commitment. To test mediation, we first need to examine
the effects of the independent variables (i.e., relative standing, importance,
and locus of control) on psychological tension: the presumed mediating
variable. Hence, we conducted a 2 (Importance: high vs. low)  3 (Relative
Standing: superior, equal, or inferior opponent)  2 (Locus of Control:
internal vs. external) univariate ANOVA on psychological tension. The
analysis reveals that all of the effects were significant and were in a manner
consistent with the hypothesis.
First, a main effect for relative standing, F(2, 312)5 27.32, po .001,
reveals greater levels of tension for a superior opponent (M5 3.25) or
an equal opponent (M5 3.28) than for an inferior opponent (M5 2.90).
As a more direct test, planned comparisons reveal a significant contrast
of inferior opponent versus equal opponent and superior opponent,
F(1, 156)5 32.32, po .001. Second, a main effect for importance,
F(1, 156)5 89.58, po .001, reveals greater levels of tension when impor-
tance was high (M5 3.52), rather than low (M5 2.76). Finally, a main effect
for locus of control, F(1, 156)5 4.88, po .05, reveals that participants with
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an external locus of control (M5 3.31) exhibited greater tension than did
individuals with an internal locus of control (M5 2.98). There were no
significant interaction effects.
Next, we conducted a 3 (Relative Standing)  2 (Importance of Out-
come)  2 (Locus of Control) ANOVA in which we included psychological
tension as a covariate. This analysis reveals, first, that the F value associated
with the contrast of an inferior opponent versus a superior opponent and an
equal opponent dropped from F(1, 156)5 14.83, po .001 (in the previous
analysis without the covariate) to F(1, 155)5 7.01, po .001. The mediator
(psychological tension) caused a significant decline in the strength of the
effect of uncertainty (Z5 - 3.23, po .005). Second, the analysis reveals
that the F value of the effect of importance of outcome declined from
F(1, 156)5 65.20, po .001 (in the previous analysis without the covariate)
to F(1,155)5 10.81, po .001, which is a significant decline (Z5 5.43,
po .001). Third, the analysis reveals that the effect of locus of control
remained significant and did not exhibit a significant decline; from
F(1, 156)5 5.29, po .05 (without covariate), to F(1, 155)5 4.58, po .05
(with covariate), which is not a significant decline (Z5 - 1.32, ns).
Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 4, psychological tension mediated both
the effect of uncertainty (caused by variations in relative standing) and the
effect of importance of the outcome. In both cases, we found significant
mediation, even though the effect remained significant, which is evidence in
support of partial mediation. The effect of locus of control was not mediated
by psychological tension. Taken together, the present findings suggest that
external circumstances regarding the outcome (importance) and the oppo-
nent (relative standing) influence psychological tension, which in turn in-
fluence the extent to which an individual wishes to or needs to enact
superstitious rituals.
Discussion
The present research examined situational and person-related influences
on ritual commitment among sportspersons; that is, the desire or need to
enact superstitious rituals before a match. The results provide good evidence
in support of most of the hypotheses.
First, consistent with Hypothesis 1, relative to an inferior opponent, an
opponent that was believed to be superior or equal to the own team elicited
greater levels of ritual commitment. Second, consistent with Hypothesis 2,
ritual commitment was greater when the importance of the outcome was
believed to be high (i.e., finals), rather than low (i.e., a training match).
Third, locus of control appeared to be significantly associated with both
ritual commitment and psychological tension, such that relative to externals,
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internals exhibited greater levels of ritual commitment and psychological
tension (supporting Hypothesis 3a). Finally, consistent with Hypothesis 4,
psychological tension appeared to mediate the effects of relative standing
and importance on ritual commitment.
The present research makes a unique contribution to the existing liter-
ature in that superstition was assessed quantitatively among a large group of
top sportspersons, looking at the combined effects of personality and sit-
uational differences on superstitious behavior, as well as the mediating effect
of psychological tension. These findings are in line with the notion that
superstitious behavior will be most pronounced when (a) uncertainty is ei-
ther high or moderate; (b) importance of succeeding is high; and (c) a person
perceives success as dependent on external factors, rather than as being
under his or her own control.
Importantly, the finding that psychological tension was found to mediate
the effects of relative standing and importance on ritual commitment sup-
ports the notion that the functionality of superstition may stem from re-
ducing psychological tension in players. As noted earlier, several theorists
have advanced this claim, but the empirical body of knowledge is exceed-
ingly small. Hence, an important contribution of the present research is that
it provides empirical support for a compelling argument that is often ad-
vanced, but hardly tested.
Moreover, the tension-reducing role of superstitious behavior extends
the literature in showing that the conditioning explanation provided by
Skinner (1948, 1953), as well as the confusing-skill-with-chance explanation
provided by Langer (1975, 1977; Langer & Roth, 1975), can be enriched
with the tension-reducing effect of rituals. The conditioning might exist
because sportspersons may try to ward off tension by enacting rituals, which
may explain why sportspersons hold on to rituals, even when the desired
outcome (i.e., winning the game) is not obtained. That is, sportspersons may
use rituals as a way to mentally prepare for a game.
The present findings extend the confusing-skill-with-chance argument in
that, perhaps, the reduction in psychological tension before a match may be
experienced as an important outcome as such. That is, one may speculate
that in preparing for a match, the most important concern is to regulate
one’s own psychological and physical state. Thus, sportspersons realistically
may see a strong link between enacting superstitious rituals and a desired
outcome. This link between enactment of rituals and the outcome of tension
reduction may be a stronger cause of ritual commitment than the more distal
link between enactment of rituals and the outcome of the match. Such
reasoning emphasizes the regulatory function of superstitious rituals, which
we believe is important to our understanding of why such rituals may come
into being and persist.
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We suggest that the tension-regulating function of superstitious rituals
may help more often than harm a team member to perform well and con-
tribute to team performance. As a case in point, research by Lobmeyer and
Wasserman (1986) indicated that rituals carried out just before taking a free
throw during a basketball game appear to influence subsequent performance
in a positive way. Moreover, their work suggested that subsequent perfor-
mance was only promoted in those who believed that the enactment of
superstitious rituals would have beneficial effects on performance. This
(potentially) illusory effect of rituals on performance is called psychological
placebo by Neil (1980), who sought to explain the positive effects of rituals in
terms of self-fulfilling prophecies and confirmation processes. Rituals
‘‘work’’ because the person believes in them and expects this.
The results of the current study show that superstitious individuals are
less self-confident and experience a higher level of psychological tension
before a match than do less superstitious persons. These findings indicate
that rituals can play a role in reducing psychological tension for sportsper-
sons. Furthermore, these findings support the idea that some perceptual
biases (i.e., superstition) may be ‘‘highly adaptive under many circum-
stances’’ (Taylor & Brown, 1988, p. 205).
One also might argue that the enactment of rituals enhance the probability
of reaching the ideal performance state (IPS; Garfield & Bennet, 1984; Will-
iams, 1986), which is characterized by feeling relaxed (both mentally and
physically), feeling full of energy, experiencing extraordinary awareness, and
being focused on the present as well as feeling in control. An ideal performance
state often is associated with a disorientation of time and place, and the person
has the feeling that things happen in slow motion. These positive states, which
parallel the optimal experience of flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, Csikszentmi-
halyi & LeFevre, 1989), may be expected to help rather than harm performing
well, perhaps more so for challenges that are closer in time. The practical
implication may be for trainers/coaches to acknowledge the potential benefits
of superstitious rituals in terms of tension reduction, and consequently en-
courage or at least not discourage the enactment of rituals by sportspersons.
Although thus far we have discussed the potential benefits and func-
tionality of the use of rituals, one might argue that the use of rituals can go
too far. For instance, some rituals may become obsessive, or too many
rituals must be carried out: In either event, they may harm rather than help
performing. For example, McCallum (1992) described how a player obses-
sively carried out so many rituals that he lost 12 pounds in 10 days. In an
interview (De Lange, 1996), a karate practitioner said that he had the su-
perstitious ritual of touching his pants during a karate tournament. This
meant that by doing this, his guard was down for a moment, providing his
opponent with an opportunity to score.
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In the examples mentioned, rituals might be useful in reducing anxiety,
but they could be detrimental to performance. In those cases, it might be
better to perform other rituals, with no harmful side effects, which can be
carried out under all circumstances. Trainers/coaches should pay attention
to the occurrence and development of superstition in players and teams, and
should be able to coach and give guidance in this respect as well. Future
research could focus on the functionality of different kinds of rituals; for
instance, by assessing the effects of type of ritual on tension and perfor-
mance of sportspersons.
We should briefly outline some limitations of the present research. While
the sample is unique in that superstitious rituals should matter most to those
who often are faced with high-stakes situations characterized by uncertainty
regarding the outcome, it is important to note that all participants were
players involved in team sports rather than individual sports. Thus, one
should be careful in generalizing the present findings to other samples or
other situations.
Perhaps more importantly, the present research used a scenario meth-
odology, which is characterized by some well-known methodological lim-
itations. For example, one may question to some degree whether
participants can place themselves in the hypothetical situations (i.e., to ‘‘ex-
perience’’ the high-stakes situation), whether tendencies toward favorable
self-presentation underlie the present findings, and whether imagined re-
sponses in hypothetical situations match actual responses in actual situa-
tions. However, some of these limitations do not seem to be crucial. For
example, top sportspersons should have little if any problem imagining the
hypothetical situations (i.e., the situations should be very real for them), and
their willingness to list a substantial number of superstitious rituals would
not follow immediately from tendencies toward favorable self-presentation.
Nevertheless, it would be desirable for future research to complement this
work by examining actual behavior; perhaps by using alternative measures
to assess psychological tension (i.e., physiological measures such as heart
rate variability), which also should reveal an important mediational role.
Although the enactment of superstitious rituals often does not make
sense to observers, it may serve an important tension-regulation function for
sportspersons prior to a match. The regulation of psychological tension
becomes especially important in situations characterized by uncertainty and
high importance. While the enactment of superstitious rituals often is be-
lieved to be unrelated to any outcome, the present findings suggest that at
least one important outcome is likely to be obtained: regulating psycholog-
ical tension. This immediate outcome may be very important to subsequent
performance; perhaps even more so when the performance is closer in time.
As such, the present research contributes not only to extant theorizing about
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superstitious rituals, but also to how coaches and fellow team members
should judge such rituals: as an inherent part of mental and physical prep-
aration to an important match in which the outcome is rather uncertain.
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